The Bell-LaPadula model is a formal model dealing with confidentiality.
The Bell-LaPadula Model (abbreviated BLP) is a state machine model used for enforcing access control in government and military applications. It was developed by David Elliott
Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula, subsequent to strong guidance from Roger R. Schell to formalize the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) multilevel security (MLS) policy. The model is a formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules which use security labels on objects and clearances for subjects.
Security labels range from the most sensitive (e.g."Top Secret"), down to the least sensitive
(e.g., "Unclassified" or "Public").
The Bell-LaPadula model focuses on data confidentiality and controlled access to classified information, in contrast to the Biba Integrity Model which describes rules for the protection of data integrity. In this formal model, the entities in an information system are divided into subjects and objects.
The notion of a "secure state" is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby inductively proving that the system satisfies the security objectives of the model. The Bell-LaPadula model is built on the concept of a state machine with a set of allowable states in a computer network system. The transition from one state to another state is defined by transition functions.
A system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in accordance with a security policy. To determine whether a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object
(more precisely, to the combination of classification and set of compartments, making up the security level) to determine if the subject is authorized for the specific access mode.
The clearance/classification scheme is expressed in terms of a lattice. The model defines two mandatory access control (MAC) rules and one discretionary access control (DAC) rule with three security properties:
The Simple Security Property - a subject at a given security level may not read an object at a higher security level (no read-up).
The -property (read "star"-property) - a subject at a given security level must not write to any object at a lower security level (no write-down). The -property is also known as the
Confinement property.
The Discretionary Security Property - use of an access matrix to specify the discretionary access control.
The following are incorrect answers:
Accountability is incorrect. Accountability requires that actions be traceable to the user that performed them and is not addressed by the Bell-LaPadula model.
Integrity is incorrect. Integrity is addressed in the Biba model rather than Bell-Lapadula.
Availability is incorrect. Availability is concerned with assuring that data/services are available to authorized users as specified in service level objectives and is not addressed by the Bell-Lapadula model.
References:
CBK, pp. 325-326
AIO3, pp. 279 - 284
AIOv4 Security Architecture and Design (pages 333 - 336)
AIOv5 Security Architecture and Design (pages 336 - 338)
Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell-La_Padula_model

The correct answer is "By modifying the timing of a system resource in some measurable way". A covert timing channel alters the timing of parts of the system to enable it to be used to communicate information covertly (outside the normal security function).
* Answer "By changing a system's stored data characteristics" is the description of the use of a covert storage channel.
* "By generating noise and traffic with the data" is a technique to combat the use of covert channels.
* Answer "By performing a covert channel analysis" is the Orange Book requirement for B3,
B2, and A1 evaluated systems.

Good forensics requires the use of a bit level copy. A bit level copy duplicates all information on the suspect's disk. This includes slack space and free space.