SSCP Exam Question 546
Which of the following would BEST be defined as an absence or weakness of safeguard that could be exploited?
Correct Answer: B
It is a software , hardware or procedural weakness that may provide an attacker the open door he is looking for to enter a computer or network and have unauthorized access to resources within the environment. A vulnerability characterizes the absence or weakness of a safeguard that could be exploited. This vulnerability may be a service running on a server, unpatched applications or operating system software etc.
The following answers are incorrect because: Threat: A threat is defined as a potential danger to information or systems. The threat is someone or something will identify a specific vulnerability and use it against the company or individual. The entity that takes advantage of a vulnerability is referred to as a 'Threat Agent'. A threat agent could be an intruder accessing the network through a port on the firewall , a process accessing data that violates the security policy. Risk:A risk is the likelihood of a threat agent taking advantage of a vulnerability and the corresponding business impact. If a firewall has several ports open , there is a higher likelihood that an intruder will use one to access the network in an unauthorized method.
Exposure: An exposure is an instance of being exposed to losses from a threat agent.
REFERENCES: SHON HARRIS , ALL IN ONE THIRD EDITION : Chapter 3 : Security Management Practices , Pages: 57-59
The following answers are incorrect because: Threat: A threat is defined as a potential danger to information or systems. The threat is someone or something will identify a specific vulnerability and use it against the company or individual. The entity that takes advantage of a vulnerability is referred to as a 'Threat Agent'. A threat agent could be an intruder accessing the network through a port on the firewall , a process accessing data that violates the security policy. Risk:A risk is the likelihood of a threat agent taking advantage of a vulnerability and the corresponding business impact. If a firewall has several ports open , there is a higher likelihood that an intruder will use one to access the network in an unauthorized method.
Exposure: An exposure is an instance of being exposed to losses from a threat agent.
REFERENCES: SHON HARRIS , ALL IN ONE THIRD EDITION : Chapter 3 : Security Management Practices , Pages: 57-59
SSCP Exam Question 547
Because ordinary cable introduces a toxic hazard in the event of fire, special cabling is required in a separate area provided for air circulation for heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (sometimes referred to as HVAC) and typically provided in the space between the structural ceiling and a drop-down ceiling. This area is referred to as the:
Correct Answer: C
In building construction, a plenum (pronounced PLEH-nuhm, from Latin meaning full) is a separate space provided for air circulation for heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (sometimes referred to as HVAC) and typically provided in the space between the structural ceiling and a drop-down ceiling. A plenum may also be under a raised floor. In buildings with computer installations, the plenum space is often used to house connecting communication cables. Because ordinary cable introduces a toxic hazard in the event of fire, special plenum cabling is required in plenum areas. Source: http://searchdatacenter.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid80_gci213716,00.html
SSCP Exam Question 548
What is the name of a one way transformation of a string of characters into a usually shorter fixed-length value or key that represents the original string? Such a transformation cannot be reversed?
Correct Answer: A
Explanation/Reference:
A cryptographic hash function is a transformation that takes an input (or 'message') and returns a fixed- size string, which is called the hash value (sometimes termed a message digest, a digital fingerprint, a digest or a checksum).
The ideal hash function has three main properties - it is extremely easy to calculate a hash for any given data, it is extremely difficult or almost impossible in a practical sense to calculate a text that has a given hash, and it is extremely unlikely that two different messages, however close, will have the same hash.
Functions with these properties are used as hash functions for a variety of purposes, both within and outside cryptography. Practical applications include message integrity checks, digital signatures, authentication, and various information security applications. A hash can also act as a concise representation of the message or document from which it was computed, and allows easy indexing of duplicate or unique data files.
In various standards and applications, the two most commonly used hash functions are MD5 and SHA-1.
In 2005, security flaws were identified in both of these, namely that a possible mathematical weakness might exist, indicating that a stronger hash function would be desirable. In 2007 the National Institute of Standards and Technology announced a contest to design a hash function which will be given the name SHA-3 and be the subject of a FIPS standard.
A hash function takes a string of any length as input and produces a fixed length string which acts as a kind of "signature" for the data provided. In this way, a person knowing the hash is unable to work out the original message, but someone knowing the original message can prove the hash is created from that message, and none other. A cryptographic hash function should behave as much as possible like a random function while still being deterministic and efficiently computable.
A cryptographic hash function is considered "insecure" from a cryptographic point of view, if either of the following is computationally feasible:
finding a (previously unseen) message that matches a given digest
finding "collisions", wherein two different messages have the same message digest.
An attacker who can do either of these things might, for example, use them to substitute an authorized message with an unauthorized one.
Ideally, it should not even be feasible to find two messages whose digests are substantially similar; nor would one want an attacker to be able to learn anything useful about a message given only its digest. Of course the attacker learns at least one piece of information, the digest itself, which for instance gives the attacker the ability to recognise the same message should it occur again.
REFERENCES:
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Pages 40-41.
also see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function
A cryptographic hash function is a transformation that takes an input (or 'message') and returns a fixed- size string, which is called the hash value (sometimes termed a message digest, a digital fingerprint, a digest or a checksum).
The ideal hash function has three main properties - it is extremely easy to calculate a hash for any given data, it is extremely difficult or almost impossible in a practical sense to calculate a text that has a given hash, and it is extremely unlikely that two different messages, however close, will have the same hash.
Functions with these properties are used as hash functions for a variety of purposes, both within and outside cryptography. Practical applications include message integrity checks, digital signatures, authentication, and various information security applications. A hash can also act as a concise representation of the message or document from which it was computed, and allows easy indexing of duplicate or unique data files.
In various standards and applications, the two most commonly used hash functions are MD5 and SHA-1.
In 2005, security flaws were identified in both of these, namely that a possible mathematical weakness might exist, indicating that a stronger hash function would be desirable. In 2007 the National Institute of Standards and Technology announced a contest to design a hash function which will be given the name SHA-3 and be the subject of a FIPS standard.
A hash function takes a string of any length as input and produces a fixed length string which acts as a kind of "signature" for the data provided. In this way, a person knowing the hash is unable to work out the original message, but someone knowing the original message can prove the hash is created from that message, and none other. A cryptographic hash function should behave as much as possible like a random function while still being deterministic and efficiently computable.
A cryptographic hash function is considered "insecure" from a cryptographic point of view, if either of the following is computationally feasible:
finding a (previously unseen) message that matches a given digest
finding "collisions", wherein two different messages have the same message digest.
An attacker who can do either of these things might, for example, use them to substitute an authorized message with an unauthorized one.
Ideally, it should not even be feasible to find two messages whose digests are substantially similar; nor would one want an attacker to be able to learn anything useful about a message given only its digest. Of course the attacker learns at least one piece of information, the digest itself, which for instance gives the attacker the ability to recognise the same message should it occur again.
REFERENCES:
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Pages 40-41.
also see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function
SSCP Exam Question 549
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) uses a Message Authentication Code (MAC) for what purpose?
Correct Answer: D
Section: Cryptography
Explanation/Reference:
A keyed hash also called a MAC (message authentication code) is used for integrity protection and authenticity.
In cryptography, a message authentication code (MAC) is a generated value used to authenticate a message.
A MAC can be generated by HMAC or CBC-MAC methods. The MAC protects both a message's integrity (by ensuring that a different MAC will be produced if the message has changed) as well as its authenticity, because only someone who knows the secret key could have modified the message.
MACs differ from digital signatures as MAC values are both generated and verified using the same secret key.
This implies that the sender and receiver of a message must agree on the same key before initiating communications, as is the case with symmetric encryption. For the same reason, MACs do not provide the property of non-repudiation offered by signatures specifically in the case of a network-wide shared secret key:
any user who can verify a MAC is also capable of generating MACs for other messages.
HMAC
When using HMAC the symmetric key of the sender would be concatenated (added at the end) with the message. The result of this process (message + secret key) would be put through a hashing algorithm, and the result would be a MAC value. This MAC value is then appended to the message being sent. If an enemy were to intercept this message and modify it, he would not have the necessary symmetric key to create a valid MAC value. The receiver would detect the tampering because the MAC value would not be valid on the receiving side.
CBC-MAC
If a CBC-MAC is being used, the message is encrypted with a symmetric block cipher in CBC mode, and the output of the final block of ciphertext is used as the MAC. The sender does not send the encrypted version of the message, but instead sends the plaintext version and the MAC attached to the message. The receiver receives the plaintext message and encrypts it with the same symmetric block cipher in CBC mode and calculates an independent MAC value. The receiver compares the new MAC value with the MAC value sent with the message. This method does not use a hashing algorithm as does HMAC.
Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)
Some security issues with CBC-MAC were found and they created Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) as a replacement. CMAC provides the same type of data origin authentication and integrity as CBC-MAC, but is more secure mathematically. CMAC is a variation of CBC-MAC. It is approved to work with AES and Triple DES. HMAC, CBC-MAC, and CMAC work higher in the network stack and can identify not only transmission errors (accidental), but also more nefarious modifications, as in an attacker messing with a message for her own benefit. This means all of these technologies can identify intentional, unauthorized modifications and accidental changes- three in one.
The following are all incorrect answers:
"Message non-repudiation" is incorrect.
Nonrepudiation is the assurance that someone cannot deny something. Typically, nonrepudiation refers to the ability to ensure that a party to a contract or a communication cannot deny the authenticity of their signature on a document or the sending of a message that they originated.
To repudiate means to deny. For many years, authorities have sought to make repudiation impossible in some situations. You might send registered mail, for example, so the recipient cannot deny that a letter was delivered. Similarly, a legal document typically requires witnesses to signing so that the person who signs cannot deny having done so.
On the Internet, a digital signature is used not only to ensure that a message or document has been electronically signed by the person that purported to sign the document, but also, since a digital signature can only be created by one person, to ensure that a person cannot later deny that they furnished the signature.
"Message confidentiality" is incorrect. The Message confidentiality is protected by encryption not by hashing algorithms.
"Message interleave checking" is incorrect. This is a nonsense term included as a distractor.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition (p. 1384). McGraw-Hill. Kindle Edition.
and
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
and
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/nonrepudiation
and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code
Explanation/Reference:
A keyed hash also called a MAC (message authentication code) is used for integrity protection and authenticity.
In cryptography, a message authentication code (MAC) is a generated value used to authenticate a message.
A MAC can be generated by HMAC or CBC-MAC methods. The MAC protects both a message's integrity (by ensuring that a different MAC will be produced if the message has changed) as well as its authenticity, because only someone who knows the secret key could have modified the message.
MACs differ from digital signatures as MAC values are both generated and verified using the same secret key.
This implies that the sender and receiver of a message must agree on the same key before initiating communications, as is the case with symmetric encryption. For the same reason, MACs do not provide the property of non-repudiation offered by signatures specifically in the case of a network-wide shared secret key:
any user who can verify a MAC is also capable of generating MACs for other messages.
HMAC
When using HMAC the symmetric key of the sender would be concatenated (added at the end) with the message. The result of this process (message + secret key) would be put through a hashing algorithm, and the result would be a MAC value. This MAC value is then appended to the message being sent. If an enemy were to intercept this message and modify it, he would not have the necessary symmetric key to create a valid MAC value. The receiver would detect the tampering because the MAC value would not be valid on the receiving side.
CBC-MAC
If a CBC-MAC is being used, the message is encrypted with a symmetric block cipher in CBC mode, and the output of the final block of ciphertext is used as the MAC. The sender does not send the encrypted version of the message, but instead sends the plaintext version and the MAC attached to the message. The receiver receives the plaintext message and encrypts it with the same symmetric block cipher in CBC mode and calculates an independent MAC value. The receiver compares the new MAC value with the MAC value sent with the message. This method does not use a hashing algorithm as does HMAC.
Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)
Some security issues with CBC-MAC were found and they created Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) as a replacement. CMAC provides the same type of data origin authentication and integrity as CBC-MAC, but is more secure mathematically. CMAC is a variation of CBC-MAC. It is approved to work with AES and Triple DES. HMAC, CBC-MAC, and CMAC work higher in the network stack and can identify not only transmission errors (accidental), but also more nefarious modifications, as in an attacker messing with a message for her own benefit. This means all of these technologies can identify intentional, unauthorized modifications and accidental changes- three in one.
The following are all incorrect answers:
"Message non-repudiation" is incorrect.
Nonrepudiation is the assurance that someone cannot deny something. Typically, nonrepudiation refers to the ability to ensure that a party to a contract or a communication cannot deny the authenticity of their signature on a document or the sending of a message that they originated.
To repudiate means to deny. For many years, authorities have sought to make repudiation impossible in some situations. You might send registered mail, for example, so the recipient cannot deny that a letter was delivered. Similarly, a legal document typically requires witnesses to signing so that the person who signs cannot deny having done so.
On the Internet, a digital signature is used not only to ensure that a message or document has been electronically signed by the person that purported to sign the document, but also, since a digital signature can only be created by one person, to ensure that a person cannot later deny that they furnished the signature.
"Message confidentiality" is incorrect. The Message confidentiality is protected by encryption not by hashing algorithms.
"Message interleave checking" is incorrect. This is a nonsense term included as a distractor.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition (p. 1384). McGraw-Hill. Kindle Edition.
and
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
and
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/nonrepudiation
and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code
SSCP Exam Question 550
Which of the following algorithms is used today for encryption in PGP?
Correct Answer: B
Explanation/Reference:
The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) email encryption system was developed by Phil Zimmerman. For encrypting messages, it actually uses AES with up to 256-bit keys, CAST, TripleDES, IDEA and Twofish.
RSA is also used in PGP, but only for symmetric key exchange and for digital signatures, but not for encryption.
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2001, Chapter 4: Cryptography (pages 154, 169).
More info on PGP can be found on their site at http://www.pgp.com/display.php?pageID=29.
The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) email encryption system was developed by Phil Zimmerman. For encrypting messages, it actually uses AES with up to 256-bit keys, CAST, TripleDES, IDEA and Twofish.
RSA is also used in PGP, but only for symmetric key exchange and for digital signatures, but not for encryption.
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2001, Chapter 4: Cryptography (pages 154, 169).
More info on PGP can be found on their site at http://www.pgp.com/display.php?pageID=29.
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