The6th AML Directive (6AMLD)introducedtighter rulesto combat financial crime, particularly aroundbeneficial ownership transparency.
* Option D (Correct):6AMLD enhances transparencyby requiring accurate and verified datain central beneficial ownership registries, making it harder to hide illicit funds behind shell companies.
* Option A (Incorrect):While some entities face increased scrutiny,crowdfunding platforms and football clubs were not the primary focusof 6AMLD.
* Option B (Incorrect):6AMLD does not remove the EU's obligation to conduct risk assessments;risk- based approaches remain centralto AML efforts.
* Option C (Incorrect):TheEU AML Authority (AMLA), planned for2024, will centralize enforcement, but6AMLD did not createthis entity.
Reference:6AMLD (Directive (EU) 2018/1673), EU AML Framework, FATF Recommendations.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the Egmont Group is an international network of FIUs that facilitates and prompts the exchange of information, knowledge, and cooperation among its members to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and associated predicate offences1. The Egmont Group suggests that one of the core objectives that would lead to an effective national FIU is to have absolute trust amongst national and international stakeholders before sensitive information will be exchanged with confidence2. This means that the FIU should establish and maintain a high level of credibility, professionalism, and integrity in its operations, and ensure that the information it receives and disseminates is protected and used appropriately. The FIU should also comply with the Egmont Group's principlesand standards for information exchange, and foster a culture of mutual trust and cooperation with other FIUs and relevant authorities3.
The other three options are incorrect because:
* The FIU must operate from physically separated premises from other law enforcement agencies and government offices is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While the FIU should have operational independence and autonomy, and be free from undue influence or interference, it does not necessarily have to be physically separated from other agencies or offices. The FIU may be located within the judicial, law enforcement, administrative, or hybrid model, depending on the country's legal and institutional framework4.
* The FIU meets the Egmont Group assessment criteria is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While meeting the Egmont Group assessment criteria is a requirement for becoming and remaining a member of the Egmont Group, it is not an objective in itself. The assessment criteria are based on the FATF recommendations and the Egmont Group's own documents, and they serve as a benchmark for evaluating the FIU's compliance and effectiveness5.
* The FIU must be able to promote the value of the government's commitment to embed a corruption free society within the country is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While the FIU may contribute to the prevention and detection of corruption, as well as the recovery of illicit assets, by analyzing and sharing financial intelligence, it is not the sole or primary responsibility of the FIU to promote the value of the government's commitment to embed a corruption free society within the country. This is a broader and more complex goal that involves multiple actors and factors, such as political will, legal framework, institutional capacity, civil society, media, and international cooperation.
1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, p. 64 2: Egmont Group, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units, June 2013, 3, p. 2 3: Egmont Group, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units, June 2013, 3, p. 3-4 4: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, p. 67 5: Egmont Group, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Support and Compliance Process, June 2013, [6], p. 3-4 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, p. 91-92 Reference: https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/books/069/02365-9781589063495-en/ap01.xml

OFAC sanctions apply extraterritoriallyto ensureU.S. financial and economic interests are protected.
* Option A (Correct):U.S. citizensmust comply with OFAC sanctionsregardless of where they are located.
* Option D (Correct):U.S.-incorporated entities and their foreign branchesare required to followOFAC restrictions.
* Option E (Correct):Permanent U.S. resident aliensare subject toOFAC complianceeven outside the U.S.
* Option B (Incorrect):Non-U.S. financial institutionsare notdirectly subject to OFACunless they have aU.
S. presenceordeal in USD transactions.
* Option C (Incorrect):Selling U.S.-origin goods does not automatically subject merchants to OFAC laws, unless they are in asanctioned jurisdiction.
Reference:OFAC Regulations, U.S. Treasury Guidance on Sanctions Compliance, USA PATRIOT Act Section 311.

MLROs are responsible for implementing and enforcing an appropriate risk-based approach for their firm, ensuring compliance with the relevant laws and regulations, and reporting any suspicious activities to the authorities. If they fail to discharge their duties, they may face personal liability and civil or criminal sanctions. MLROs are not the only individuals that can be held responsible for AML program deficiencies, as other seniormanagers, directors, or partners may also be liable depending on their role and involvement.
However, MLROs are often the primary focus of enforcement actions due to their specific responsibilities and obligations. MLROs cannot avoid liability by agreeing to a civil penalty, as this does not absolve them from their legal duties or potential criminal prosecution. Banks can also be found liable for AML program deficiencies and face fines, penalties, or other sanctions.
Technical factsheet The role of the money laundering reporting officer
Consequences of not complying | AUSTRAC
Money Laundering Reporting Officer: The Role Of MLRO
FinCEN Penalizes U.S. Bank Official for Corporate Anti-Money Laundering Failures

Before disclosing any supporting documentation for a suspicious transaction report (STR) to a law enforcement agency, the financial institution should confirm thatthe request is legitimate and authorized by verifying the identity and credentials of the requester1. This is to prevent unauthorized access or misuse of the confidential information by impostors or fraudsters. The other options are not true, as they may either compromise the security, integrity, or timeliness of the disclosure, or violate the confidentiality or privacy rights of the customer.
ACAMS, CAMS Examination Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, p. 117
FATF Guidance: The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, October 20132, p. 20 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism, June 20173, p. 11 Reference:https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/aml2007/fin-2007-g003.pdf