When considering sharing information across the institution or within the same jurisdiction, the key legal issue that poses challenges to sharing customer-related information is data protection and privacy laws. Data protection and privacy laws exist in most countries and can vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
These laws place restrictions on how customer data can be used, shared, and stored, and can limit the ability of financial institutions to share customer-related information with each other. Additionally, these laws may also require financial institutions to take additional steps to ensure the protection of customer data.

According to the ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 38, one of the steps that a financial institution should take when it suspects money laundering activity is to file a suspicious transaction report (STR) or a suspicious activity report (SAR) to the relevant authorities. This will alert the regulators and law enforcement of the potentialmoney laundering scheme and provide them with valuable information to trace the funds and identify the perpetrators.
Another step that a financial institution should take is to identify any unusual or suspicious wire transfers initiated by casas de cambio to jurisdictions outside of Mexico that bear no apparent business relationship with that casa de cambio. This could indicate that the casas de cambio are involved in layering and integration stages of money laundering, where they are moving the illicit funds across borders and disguising their origin and ownership. The financial institution should monitor and document these wire transfers and report them to the authorities if necessary.
Option B is not a relevant step to trace funds through the bank, as it does not provide any information about the source, destination, or purpose of the funds. A decrease in the sale of large denomination U.S. bank notes to casas de cambio by the bank could be due to various factors, such as market demand, exchange rates, or regulatory changes, and does not necessarily indicate money laundering activity.
Option C is also not a relevant step to trace funds through the bank, as it does not indicate any connection to the suspected money laundering scheme. Deposits by casas de cambio that include third-party items, such as sequentially numbered monetary instruments, could be legitimate transactions that are part of the normal business operations of the casas de cambio. Unless there is evidence that these deposits are related to the sale of large denomination U.S. bank notes or the Mexican syndicate, they are not useful for tracing the funds.
ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 38
Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance
Sting Operation Snares Casa de Cambio for Allegedly Laundering Millions Through U.S. Banks

Human trafficking and modern slavery involve illicit financial transactions, often conducted through banks, money service businesses (MSBs), or virtual assets.
Option B (Correct): Frequent payments for online advertisements can indicate recruitment for illicit labor or trafficking operations.
Option C (Correct): Incoming funds from third-party processors with unclear originators suggest concealed financial flows linked to illicit activities.
Why Other Options Are Incorrect:
Option A (Incorrect): Transactional activity with a virtual currency exchange alone is not a strong human trafficking red flag.
Option D (Incorrect): Cash payments to workers could indicate labor law violations but do not necessarily indicate human trafficking.
Common Financial Red Flags for Human Trafficking:
Unexplained cash deposits and withdrawals from multiple accounts.
Frequent wire transfers to high-risk jurisdictions.
Use of prepaid cards to move funds anonymously.
Best Practices for Detecting & Preventing Human Trafficking-Related Transactions:
Train frontline staff to recognize financial indicators of trafficking.
Monitor unusual transaction patterns in industries with high labor exploitation risks.
File Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) when trafficking-related transactions are suspected.
Reference:
FinCEN Human Trafficking Financial Red Flags (2021)
FATF Report on Financial Flows Linked to Human Trafficking
6th EU AML Directive (6AMLD) on Human Trafficking & Financial Crime

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), the financial institution (Fl) should take the following actions:
A: Review the client's activity, determine if suspicious activity exists, and report accordingly. The Fl should assess the risk of the situation and determine if there is any suspicious activity that needs to be reported to the appropriate authorities. This would involve conducting a review of the client's account activity and transactions to determine if there are any indicators of money laundering or terrorist financing.
D: Inform local LEA and regulator of the request for awareness. The Fl should inform the local law enforcement agency and regulator of the request from the foreign jurisdiction to raise awareness of the situation and determine if any further actions need to be taken.

These are the information that can help the correspondent bank to assess the risk profile, the regulatory compliance, and the operational capacity of the respondent bank, and to verify its identity and legitimacy. The correspondent bank should obtain and verify the following information about the respondent bank:
* Respondent's management, nature of license, and major business activity. This can help the correspondent bank to understand the governance, the legal status, and the core functions of the respondent bank, and to evaluate its reputation, integrity, and competence.
* The quality of supervision in the home country. This can help the correspondent bank to determine the level of oversight and regulation that the respondent bank is subject to, and to identify any potential gaps or weaknesses in the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) framework of the home country.
* Respondent's location, in particular the existence of a real physical presence. This can help the correspondent bank to verify the actual existence and operation of the respondent bank, and to avoid dealing with shell banks or banks located in high-risk or non-cooperative jurisdictions.
The other option is not necessarily information that should be included to establish a rigorous "Know Your Respondent" procedure, although it may have some relevance or importance depending on the circumstances and the nature of the correspondent relationship. Option 2 describes computer equipment and software capability, which may be useful to assess the technical and operational compatibility and efficiency of the respondent bank, but it is not essential to evaluate its risk or compliance level.
ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - 6th Edition1
Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2 ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 7, pages 154-155
https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACAMS-CAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-7.pdf