According to the FATF Recommendations, the competent authority that should directly receive suspicious or unusual transaction reports is the financial intelligence unit (FIU). The FIU is a central, national agency responsible for receiving, analyzing and disseminating information related to money laundering and terrorist financing. The FIU should have operational independence and autonomy, and should be able to exchange information with other domestic and foreign authorities. The FIU should also provide feedback to the reporting entities on the use and value of their reports.
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CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS1
CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS2
ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs3
Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)4 FATF Recommendations, Recommendation 29: Financial Intelligence Units
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.
pdf

When an FI is being investigated for possible money laundering, it is important that it cooperates with the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in a professional and transparent manner. This means that the FI should take the following steps:
* Maintain centralized control over all requests and responses to ensure completeness and timely responses. This will help the FI to avoid duplication, inconsistency, or omission of information, as well as to track the status and progress of the requests and responses. It will also facilitate the communication and coordination between the FI and the LEAs, and demonstrate the FI's willingness to cooperate12.
* Review subpoenas and other information requests by senior management and an investigations group or counsel. This will help the FI to assess the scope, relevance, and legality of the requests, as well as to identify any potential risks, conflicts, or sensitivities. It will also enable the FI to prepare and provide the requested information in an accurate and timely manner, and to seek clarification or negotiation if necessary13.
The other options are not advisable, as they may indicate a lack of cooperation, obstruct the investigation, or damage the FI's reputation. For example:
* Making employees, including corporate officers, unavailable for interviews and refusing documents upon receipt of a subpoena may be considered as non-compliance, evasion, or contempt of court, and may result in legal sanctions or penalties4.
* Addressing the document destruction policy to ensure the relevant documents are destroyed may be seen as tampering with evidence, destroying records, or concealing information, and may constitute a criminal offence or a breach of regulatory obligations5.
* Not answering inquiries from the media directly, but rather replying, "No comment" may create a negative impression, fuel speculation, or invite criticism, and may harm the FI's image, credibility, or trustworthiness.
Cooperation between FIUs, Law Enforcement Authorities, and Prosecutors
AML and Financial crimes investigation
Mechanisms for interaction of law enforcement agencies in the field of counteracting and combating money laundering Recommendation 30: Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities Money laundering and illicit finance

Transaction monitoring alerts requirefurther analysisto determine whether they indicategenuine suspicious activity or a false positive.
* Option C (Correct):Requesting information from the relationship manager helps gather customer background details, past transaction patterns, and business rationale.
* Option A (Incorrect):Below-the-line testing assesses system effectiveness but does not resolve an immediate AML alert.
* Option B (Incorrect):Directly contacting a counterparty bank may violate privacy regulations and should only be done if escalation is required.
* Option D (Incorrect):Restricting access without due diligence may lead to regulatory and reputational risks.
Best Practices for Investigating AML Alerts:
* Review transaction history and customer risk profile.
* Engage the relationship manager for business context.
* Escalate to AML compliance teams if red flags persist.
Reference:
FATF Recommendation 10 (Customer Due Diligence & Monitoring)
Wolfsberg Group Guidance on Transaction Monitoring & Alert Handling
6th EU AML Directive (6AMLD) on Suspicious Transaction Investigations

As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs." Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. So it's covering all

U).S. law requires that assets and accounts of an OFAC-specified country, entity, or individual be blocked when such property is located in the United States, is held by U.S. individuals or entities, or comes into the possession or control of U.S. individuals or entities.
For example, if a funds transfer comes from offshore and is being routed through a U.S. bank to an offshore bank, and there is an OFAC-designated party to the transaction, it must be blocked. The definition of assets and property is broad and is specifically defined within each sanction program. Assets and property includes anything of direct, indirect, present, future, or contingent value (including all types of bank transactions).
Banks must block transactions that:
* Are by or on behalf of a blocked individual or entity;
* Are to or go through a blocked entity; or
* Are in connection with a transaction in which a blocked individual or entity has an interest.