After applying mitigations that reduce the likelihood of a risk's impact, the next step is toassess the residual risk-the risk that remains after controls are implemented. This ensures the organization understands if the mitigation is sufficient or if further action is needed, aligning with risk management best practices.
Option A:Correct-residual risk assessment is the logical next step to evaluate the effectiveness of mitigations.
Option B:Updating the threat model might follow but isn't immediate; residual risk comes first.
Option C:Moving to the next risk skips evaluating the current mitigation's success.
Option D:Recalculating impact magnitude is part of residual risk assessment but isn't the full process.

Forward secrecy (also known as perfect forward secrecy, PFS) ensures that session keys used in a VPN tunnel are ephemeral, meaning that even if an attacker compromises a long-term private key, past sessions cannot be decrypted. According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 study guide (Domain 3: Cybersecurity Technology, 3.1), enabling forward secrecy on VPN tunnels reduces the risk of cryptanalysis by ensuring that each session's encryption key is unique and not derived from a single compromised key. This directly mitigates the impact of attacks like key theft or future decryption attempts.
Option A:Forward secrecy is not required for hardware-accelerated cryptography, which depends on processor capabilities, not key management.
Option C:While confidentiality is important, this is too vague and does not specifically explain why forward secrecy is chosen.
Option D:Modern protocols (e.g., TLS 1.3, IPsec with ECDHE) support forward secrecy but donot mandate it as a prerequisite for use.
Option B:This is the most precise, as forward secrecy directly reduces the success of cryptanalysis by limiting the scope of key compromise.
Reference:
CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 Official Study Guide, Domain 3: Cybersecurity Technology, Section 3.1: "Explain cryptographic techniques, including perfect forward secrecy." CAS-005 Exam Objectives, 3.1: "Evaluate the impact of cryptographic configurations on security."

The most likely cause of the anti-malware alerts on customer workstations is unsecure bundled libraries. When developing and deploying new applications, it is common for developers to use third-party libraries. If these libraries are not properly vetted for security, they can introduce vulnerabilities or malicious code.
Why Unsecure Bundled Libraries?
Third-Party Risks: Using libraries that are not secure can lead to malware infections if the libraries contain malicious code or vulnerabilities.
Code Dependencies: Libraries may have dependencies that are not secure, leading to potential security risks.
Common Issue: This is a frequent issue in software development where libraries are used for convenience but not properly vetted for security.
Other options, while relevant, are less likely to cause widespread anti-malware alerts:
A . Misconfigured code commit: Could lead to issues but less likely to trigger anti-malware alerts.
C . Invalid code signing certificate: Would lead to trust issues but not typically anti-malware alerts.
D . Data leakage: Relevant for privacy concerns but not directly related to anti-malware alerts.
Reference:
CompTIA SecurityX Study Guide
"Securing Open Source Libraries," OWASP
"Managing Third-Party Software Security Risks," Gartner Research

To prevent unauthorized applications from running, the company needs a mechanism to explicitly define and enforce which applications are allowed to execute. "Permit listing" (often referred to as "whitelisting" in security contexts) is the most effective solution here. It involves creating a list of approved applications, and only those on the list are permitted to run, blocking all others by default. This directly addresses the root cause-users installing unapproved software-by restricting execution to only authorized programs.
Option A (Signing): Code signing ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by verifying it comes from a trusted source and hasn't been tampered with. While useful, it doesn't inherently prevent unauthorized applications from running unless combined with a policy like whitelisting.
Option B (Access control): Access control governs who can access systems or resources but doesn't specifically restrict which applications can execute. It's too broad for this scenario.
Option C (HIPS): A Host-based Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) can detect and block malicious behavior, but it's reactive and relies on signatures or heuristics, not a proactive allow-only approach.
Option D (Permit listing): This is the best fit, as it proactively enforces a policy where only explicitly authorized applications can run, preventing malware introduced by unauthorized software.

In the context of improving incident response and reducing dwell time, the security analyst needs to focus on proactive measures that can quickly detect and alert on potential security breaches. Here's a detailed analysis of the options provided:
A . Adjusting the SIEM to alert on attempts to visit phishing sites: While this is a useful measure to prevent phishing attacks, it primarily addresses external threats and doesn't directly impact dwell time reduction, which focuses on the time a threat remains undetected within a network.
B . Allowing TRACE method traffic to enable better log correlation: The TRACE method in HTTP is used for debugging purposes, but enabling it can introduce security vulnerabilities. It's not typically recommended for enhancing security monitoring or incident response.
C . Enabling alerting on all suspicious administrator behavior: This option directly targets the potential misuse of administrator accounts, which are often high-value targets for attackers. By monitoring and alerting on suspicious activities from admin accounts, the organization can quickly identify and respond to potential breaches, thereby reducing dwell time significantly. Suspicious behavior could include unusual login times, access to sensitive data not usually accessed by the admin, or any deviation from normal behavior patterns. This proactive monitoring is crucial for quick detection and response, aligning well with best practices in incident response.
D . Utilizing allow lists on the WAF for all users using GET methods: This measure is aimed at restricting access based on allowed lists, which can be effective in preventing unauthorized access but doesn't specifically address the need for quick detection and response to internal threats.
Reference:
CompTIA SecurityX Study Guide: Emphasizes the importance of monitoring and alerting on admin activities as part of a robust incident response plan.
NIST Special Publication 800-61 Revision 2,"Computer Security Incident Handling Guide": Highlights best practices for incident response, including the importance of detecting and responding to suspicious activities quickly.
"Incident Response & Computer Forensics" by Jason T. Luttgens, Matthew Pepe, and Kevin Mandia: Discusses techniques for reducing dwell time through effective monitoring and alerting mechanisms, particularly focusing on privileged account activities.
By focusing on enabling alerting for suspicious administrator behavior, the security analyst addresses a critical area that can help reduce the time a threat goes undetected, thereby improving the overall security posture of the organization.
Top of Form
Bottom of Form