This question focuses on post-incident recovery and resilience, a key ECIH concept. After restoring services, organizations must strengthen defenses to prevent recurrence.
Option B is correct because Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) distribute traffic and absorb volumetric attacks, while blackhole routing discards malicious traffic upstream. ECIH identifies these as industry-standard controls for DDoS resilience.
Options A, C, and D weaken security or increase attack surface and contradict ECIH guidance.
ECIH stresses that recovery is not complete until preventive measures are implemented. CDN deployment and upstream traffic control significantly improve availability during future attacks.

The scenario described fits the characteristics of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack.
APTs are sophisticated, stealthy, and continuous computer hacking processes often orchestrated by groups targeting a specific entity. These attackers penetrate the network through vulnerabilities, maintain access without detection, and achieve their objectives, such as data exfiltration or financial theft, over an extended period. The fact that attackers exploited a minor vulnerability, maintained access for six months, and performed lateral movements to access critical systems for fraudulent transactions highlights the strategic planning and persistence typical of APT attacks.

The GPG18 and Forensic readiness planning (SPF) principles outline various guidelines to enhance an organization's readiness for forensic investigation and response. Principle 5, which suggests that organizations should adopt a scenario-based Forensic Readiness Planning approach that learns from experience gained within the business, emphasizes the importance of being prepared for a wide range of potential incidents by leveraging lessons learned from past experiences. This approach helps in continuously improving forensic readiness and response capabilities by adapting to the evolving threat landscape and organizational changes.

Synthetic identity theft is a type of fraud where the perpetrator combines real (often stolen) and fake information to create a new identity. This can include combining a real social security number with a fictitious name, or other variations that result in an identity that is not entirely real but has elements that can pass through verification processes. In the scenario described, Adam is creating a new identity using information from different victims, which is characteristic of synthetic identity theft. This type of fraud is particularly challenging to detect and counter because it does not directly impersonate a single real individual but creates a plausible new identity that can be used to open accounts, obtain credit, and conduct transactions that can be financially beneficial to the attacker.