Explanation/Reference:
Explanation:
The purpose of digital signatures is to detect unauthorized modifications of data, and to authenticate the identity of the signatories and non-repudiation. These functions are accomplished by generating a block of data that is usually smaller than the size of the original data. This smaller block of data is bound to the original data and to the identity of the sender. This binding verifies the integrity of data and provides non- repudiation. To quote the National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST) Digital Signature Standard (DSS): Digital signatures are used to detect unauthorized modifications to data and to authenticate the identity of the signatory. In addition, the recipient of signed data can use a digital signature in proving to a third party that the signature was in fact generated by the signatory.
Incorrect Answers:
A: Digital signatures do not provide encryption.
B: A digital signature is not the art of transferring handwritten signature to electronic media.
D: A digital signature cannot be used as a signature system and a cryptosystem.
References:
Krutz, Ronald L. and Russel Dean Vines, The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2001, p. 151

Under the Common Criteria model, an evaluation is carried out on a product and is assigned an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL). The thorough and stringent testing increases in detailed-oriented tasks as the assurance levels increase. The Common Criteria has seven assurance levels. The range is from EAL1, where functionality testing takes place, to EAL7, where thorough testing is performed and the system design is verified. The Orange Book and the Rainbow Series provide evaluation schemes that are too rigid and narrowly defined for the business world. ITSEC attempted to provide a more flexible approach by separating the functionality and assurance attributes and considering the evaluation of entire systems. However, this flexibility added complexity because evaluators could mix and match functionality and assurance ratings, which resulted in too many classifications to keep straight. Because we are a species that continues to try to get it right, the next attempt for an effective and usable evaluation criteria was the Common Criteria. In 1990, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) identified the need for international standard evaluation criteria to be used globally. The Common Criteria project started in 1993 when several organizations came together to combine and align existing and emerging evaluation criteria (TCSEC, ITSEC, Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria [CTCPEC], and the Federal Criteria). The Common Criteria was developed through a collaboration among national security standards organizations within the United States, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. The benefit of having a globally recognized and accepted set of criteria is that it helps consumers by reducing the complexity of the ratings and eliminating the need to understand the definition and meaning of different ratings within various evaluation schemes. This also helps vendors, because now they can build to one specific set of requirements if they want to sell their products internationally, instead of having to meet several different ratings with varying rules and requirements.
The full list of assurance requirements for the Evaluation Assurance Levels is provided below:
EAL 1: The product is functionally tested; this is sought when some assurance in accurate
operation is necessary, but the threats to security are not seen as serious.
EAL 2: Structurally tested; this is sought when developers or users need a low to moderate level of
independently guaranteed security.
EAL 3: Methodically tested and checked; this is sought when there is a need for a moderate level
of independently ensured security.
EAL 4: Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed; this is sought when developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently ensured security.
EAL 5: Semiformally designed and tested; this is sought when the requirement is for a high level of
independently ensured security.
EAL 6: Semiformally verified, designed, and tested; this is sought when developing specialized
TOEs for high-risk situations.
EAL 7: Formally verified, designed, and tested; this is sought when developing a security TOE for
application in extremely high-risk situations.
EALs are frequently misunderstood to provide a simple means to compare security products with
similar levels. In fact, products may be very different even if they are assigned the same EAL level,
since functionality may have little in common.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Corporate; (Isc)2 (2010-04-20). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Second Edition ((ISC)2
Press) (Kindle Locations 15157-15169). Taylor & Francis. Kindle Edition.
and
Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition (Kindle Locations 8730-
8742). McGraw-Hill. Kindle Edition.

A security domain is a domain of trust that shares a single security policy and single management.
The term security domain just builds upon the definition of domain by adding the fact that resources within this logical structure (domain) are working under the same security policy and managed by the same group.
So, a network administrator may put all of the accounting personnel, computers, and network resources in Domain 1 and all of the management personnel, computers, and network resources in Domain 2. These items fall into these individual containers because they not only carry out similar types of business functions, but also, and more importantly, have the same type of trust level. It is this common trust level that allows entities to be managed by one single security policy.
The different domains are separated by logical boundaries, such as firewalls with ACLs, directory services making access decisions, and objects that have their own ACLs indicating which individuals and groups can carry out operations on them.
All of these security mechanisms are examples of components that enforce the security policy for each domain. Domains can be architected in a hierarchical manner that dictates the relationship between the different domains and the ways in which subjects within the different domains can communicate. Subjects can access resources in domains of equal or lower trust levels.
The following are incorrect answers:
The reference monitor is an abstract machine which must mediate all access to subjects to objects, be protected from modification, be verifiable as correct, and is always invoked.
Concept that defines a set of design requirements of a reference validation mechanism
(security kernel), which enforces an access control policy over subjects' (processes, users) ability to perform operations (read, write, execute) on objects (files, resources) on a system. The reference monitor components must be small enough to test properly and be tamperproof.
The security kernel is the hardware, firmware and software elements of a trusted computing base that implement the reference monitor concept.
The security perimeter includes the security kernel as well as other security-related system functions that are within the boundary of the trusted computing base. System elements that are outside of the security perimeter need not be trusted. not every process and resource falls within the TCB, so some of these components fall outside of an imaginary boundary referred to as the security perimeter. A security perimeter is a boundary that divides the trusted from the untrusted. For the system to stay in a secure and trusted state, precise communication standards must be developed to ensure that when a component within the
TCB needs to communicate with a component outside the TCB, the communication cannot expose the system to unexpected security compromises. This type of communication is handled and controlled through interfaces.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition (Kindle Locations
2 8548-28550). McGraw-Hill. Kindle Edition.
Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition (Kindle Locations
7 873-7877). McGraw-Hill. Kindle Edition.
Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition , Access Control,
Page 214-217
Schneiter, Andrew (2013-04-15). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Third Edition :
Security Architecture and Design (Kindle Locations 1280-1283). . Kindle Edition.
TIPTON, Hal, (ISC)2, Introduction to the CISSP Exam presentation.
AIO 6th edition chapter 3 access control page 214-217 defines Security domains.
Reference monitor, Security Kernel, and Security Parameter are defined in Chapter 4,
Security Architecture and Design.