Section: Risk, Response and Recovery
Explanation/Reference:
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to a seizure or an arrest by private citizens.
Search and seizure activities can get tricky depending on what is being searched for and where.
For example, American citizens are protected by the Fourth Amendment against unlawful search and seizure, so law enforcement agencies must have probable cause and request a search warrant from a judge or court before conducting such a search.
The actual search can only take place in the areas outlined by the warrant. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to actions by private citizens unless they are acting as police agents. So, for example, if Kristy's boss warned all employees that the management could remove files from their computers at any time, and her boss was not a police officer or acting as a police agent, she could not successfully claim that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Kristy's boss may have violated some specific privacy laws, but he did not violate Kristy's Fourth Amendment rights.
In some circumstances, a law enforcement agent may seize evidence that is not included in the warrant, such as if the suspect tries to destroy the evidence. In other words, if there is an impending possibility that evidence might be destroyed, law enforcement may quickly seize the evidence to prevent its destruction. This is referred to as exigent circumstances, and a judge will later decide whether the seizure was proper and legal before allowing the evidence to be admitted. For example, if a police officer had a search warrant that allowed him to search a suspect's living room but no other rooms, and then he saw the suspect dumping cocaine down the toilet, the police officer could seize the cocaine even though it was in a room not covered under his search warrant. After evidence is gathered, the chain of custody needs to be enacted and enforced to make sure the evidence's integrity is not compromised.
All other choices were only detractors.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Harris, Shon (2012-10-25). CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition (p. 1057). McGraw-Hill. Kindle Edition.

Section: Cryptography
Explanation/Reference:
If we assume a crytpo-system with a large key (and therefore a large key space) a brute force attack will likely take a good deal of time - anywhere from several hours to several years depending on a number of variables. If you use a session key for each message you encrypt, then the brute force attack provides the attacker with only the key for that one message. So, if you are encrypting 10 messages a day, each with a different session key, but it takes me a month to break each session key then I am fighting a loosing battle.
The other answers are not correct because:
"The use of good key generators" is not correct because a brute force key attack will eventually run through all possible combinations of key. Therefore, any key will eventually be broken in this manner given enough time.
"Nothing can defend you against a brute force crypto key attack" is incorrect, and not the best answer listed.
While it is technically true that any key will eventually be broken by a brute force attack, the question remains
"how long will it take?". In other words, if you encrypt something today but I can't read it for 10,000 years, will you still care? If the key is changed every session does it matter if it can be broken after the session has ended? Of the answers listed here, session keys are "often considered a good protection against the brute force cryptography attack" as the question asks.
"Algorithms that are immune to brute force key attacks" is incorrect because there currently are no such algorithms.
References:
Official ISC2 Guide page: 259
All in One Third Edition page: 623

Section: Security Operation Adimnistration
Explanation/Reference:
The multilevel security mode permits two or more classification levels of information to be processed at the same time when all the users do not have the clearance of formal approval to access all the information being processed by the system.
In dedicated security mode, all users have the clearance or authorization and need-to-know to all data processed within the system.
In system-high security mode, all users have a security clearance or authorization to access the information but not necessarily a need-to-know for all the information processed on the system (only some of the data).
In compartmented security mode, all users have the clearance to access all the information processed by the system, but might not have the need-to-know and formal access approval.
Generally, Security modes refer to information systems security modes of operations used in mandatory access control (MAC) systems. Often, these systems contain information at various levels of security classification.
The mode of operation is determined by:
The type of users who will be directly or indirectly accessing the system.
The type of data, including classification levels, compartments, and categories, that are processed on the system.
The type of levels of users, their need to know, and formal access approvals that the users will have.
Dedicated security mode
In this mode of operation, all users must have:
Signed NDA for ALL information on the system.
Proper clearance for ALL information on the system.
Formal access approval for ALL information on the system.
A valid need to know for ALL information on the system.
All users can access ALL data.
System high security mode
In this mode of operation, all users must have:
Signed NDA for ALL information on the system.
Proper clearance for ALL information on the system.
Formal access approval for ALL information on the system.
A valid need to know for SOME information on the system.
All users can access SOME data, based on their need to know.
Compartmented security mode
In this mode of operation, all users must have:
Signed NDA for ALL information on the system.
Proper clearance for ALL information on the system.
Formal access approval for SOME information they will access on the system.
A valid need to know for SOME information on the system.
All users can access SOME data, based on their need to know and formal access approval.
Multilevel security mode
In this mode of operation, all users must have:
Signed NDA for ALL information on the system.
Proper clearance for SOME information on the system.
Formal access approval for SOME information on the system.
A valid need to know for SOME information on the system.
All users can access SOME data, based on their need to know, clearance and formal access approval.
REFERENCES:
WALLHOFF, John, CBK#6 Security Architecture and Models (CISSP Study Guide), April 2002 (page 6).
and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Modes

Section: Access Control
Explanation/Reference: HARRIS, Shon, All-In-One CISSP Certification Exam Guide, 2001, McGraw-Hill/Osborne, page
139;
SNYDER, J., What is a SMART CARD?.
Wikipedia has a nice definition at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamper_resistance Security Tamper-resistant microprocessors are used to store and process private or sensitive information, such as private keys or electronic money credit. To prevent an attacker from retrieving or modifying the information, the chips are designed so that the information is not accessible through external means and can be accessed only by the embedded software, which should contain the appropriate security measures.
Examples of tamper-resistant chips include all secure cryptoprocessors, such as the IBM 4758 and chips used in smartcards, as well as the Clipper chip.
It has been argued that it is very difficult to make simple electronic devices secure against tampering, because numerous attacks are possible, including:
physical attack of various forms (microprobing, drills, files, solvents, etc.) freezing the device applying out-of-spec voltages or power surges applying unusual clock signals inducing software errors using radiation measuring the precise time and power requirements of certain operations (see power analysis) Tamper-resistant chips may be designed to zeroise their sensitive data (especially cryptographic keys) if they detect penetration of their security encapsulation or out-of-specification environmental parameters. A chip may even be rated for "cold zeroisation", the ability to zeroise itself even after its power supply has been crippled.
Nevertheless, the fact that an attacker may have the device in his possession for as long as he likes, and perhaps obtain numerous other samples for testing and practice, means that it is practically impossible to totally eliminate tampering by a sufficiently motivated opponent. Because of this, one of the most important elements in protecting a system is overall system design. In particular, tamper-resistant systems should "fail gracefully" by ensuring that compromise of one device does not compromise the entire system. In this manner, the attacker can be practically restricted to attacks that cost less than the expected return from compromising a single device (plus, perhaps, a little more for kudos). Since the most sophisticated attacks have been estimated to cost several hundred thousand dollars to carry out, carefully designed systems may be invulnerable in practice.