Section: Network and Telecommunications
Explanation/Reference:
It may seem odd to have two different protocols that provide overlapping functionality.
AH provides authentication and integrity, and ESP can provide those two functions and confidentiality.
Why even bother with AH then?
In most cases, the reason has to do with whether the environment is using network address translation (NAT).
IPSec will generate an integrity check value (ICV), which is really the same thing as a MAC value, over a portion of the packet. Remember that the sender and receiver generate their own values. In IPSec, it is called an ICV value. The receiver compares her ICV value with the one sent by the sender. If the values match, the receiver can be assured the packet has not been modified during transmission. If the values are different, the packet has been altered and the receiver discards the packet.
The AH protocol calculates this ICV over the data payload, transport, and network headers. If the packet then goes through a NAT device, the NAT device changes the IP address of the packet. That is its job. This means a portion of the data (network header) that was included to calculate the ICV value has now changed, and the receiver will generate an ICV value that is different from the one sent with the packet, which means the packet will be discarded automatically.
The ESP protocol follows similar steps, except it does not include the network header portion when calculating its ICV value. When the NAT device changes the IP address, it will not affect the receiver's ICV value because it does not include the network header when calculating the ICV.
Here is a tutorial on IPSEC from the Shon Harris Blog:
The Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) protocol suite provides a method of setting up a secure channel for protected data exchange between two devices. The devices that share this secure channel can be two servers, two routers, a workstation and a server, or two gateways between different networks. IPSec is a widely accepted standard for providing network layer protection. It can be more flexible and less expensive than end- to end and link encryption methods.
IPSec has strong encryption and authentication methods, and although it can be used to enable tunneled communication between two computers, it is usually employed to establish virtual private networks (VPNs) among networks across the Internet.
IPSec is not a strict protocol that dictates the type of algorithm, keys, and authentication method to use. Rather, it is an open, modular framework that provides a lot of flexibility for companies when they choose to use this type of technology. IPSec uses two basic security protocols: Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). AH is the authenticating protocol, and ESP is an authenticating and encrypting protocol that uses cryptographic mechanisms to provide source authentication, confidentiality, and message integrity.
IPSec can work in one of two modes: transport mode, in which the payload of the message is protected, and tunnel mode, in which the payload and the routing and header information are protected. ESP in transport mode encrypts the actual message information so it cannot be sniffed and uncovered by an unauthorized entity. Tunnel mode provides a higher level of protection by also protecting the header and trailer data an attacker may find useful. Figure 8-26 shows the high-level view of the steps of setting up an IPSec connection.
Each device will have at least one security association (SA) for each VPN it uses. The SA, which is critical to the IPSec architecture, is a record of the configurations the device needs to support an IPSec connection.
When two devices complete their handshaking process, which means they have agreed upon a long list of parameters they will use to communicate, these data must be recorded and stored somewhere, which is in the SA.
The SA can contain the authentication and encryption keys, the agreed-upon algorithms, the key lifetime, and the source IP address. When a device receives a packet via the IPSec protocol, it is the SA that tells the device what to do with the packet. So if device B receives a packet from device C via IPSec, device B will look to the corresponding SA to tell it how to decrypt the packet, how to properly authenticate the source of the packet, which key to use, and how to reply to the message if necessary.
SAs are directional, so a device will have one SA for outbound traffic and a different SA for inbound traffic for each individual communication channel. If a device is connecting to three devices, it will have at least six SAs, one for each inbound and outbound connection per remote device. So how can a device keep all of these SAs organized and ensure that the right SA is invoked for the right connection? With the mighty secu rity parameter index (SPI), that's how. Each device has an SPI that keeps track of the different SAs and tells the device which one is appropriate to invoke for the different packets it receives. The SPI value is in the header of an IPSec packet, and the device reads this value to tell it which SA to consult.
IPSec can authenticate the sending devices of the packet by using MAC (covered in the earlier section, "The One-Way Hash"). The ESP protocol can provide authentication, integrity, and confidentiality if the devices are configured for this type of functionality.
So if a company just needs to make sure it knows the source of the sender and must be assured of the integrity of the packets, it would choose to use AH. If the company would like to use these services and also have confidentiality, it would use the ESP protocol because it provides encryption functionality. In most cases, the reason ESP is employed is because the company must set up a secure VPN connection.
It may seem odd to have two different protocols that provide overlapping functionality. AH provides authentication and integrity, and ESP can provide those two functions and confidentiality. Why even bother with AH then? In most cases, the reason has to do with whether the environment is using network address translation (NAT). IPSec will generate an integrity check value (ICV), which is really the same thing as a MAC value, over a portion of the packet. Remember that the sender and receiver generate their own values. In IPSec, it is called an ICV value. The receiver compares her ICV value with the one sent by the sender. If the values match, the receiver can be assured the packet has not been modified during transmission. If the values are different, the packet has been altered and the receiver discards the packet.
The AH protocol calculates this ICV over the data payload, transport, and network headers. If the packet then goes through a NAT device, the NAT device changes the IP address of the packet. That is its job. This means a portion of the data (network header) that was included to calculate the ICV value has now changed, and the receiver will generate an ICV value that is different from the one sent with the packet, which means the packet will be discarded automatically.
The ESP protocol follows similar steps, except it does not include the network header portion when calculating its ICV value. When the NAT device changes the IP address, it will not affect the receiver's ICV value because it does not include the network header when calculating the ICV.
Because IPSec is a framework, it does not dictate which hashing and encryption algorithms are to be used or how keys are to be exchanged between devices. Key management can be handled manually or automated by a key management protocol. The de facto standard for IPSec is to use Internet Key Exchange (IKE), which is a combination of the ISAKMP and OAKLEY protocols. The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) is a key exchange architecture that is independent of the type of keying mechanisms used.
Basically, ISAKMP provides the framework of what can be negotiated to set up an IPSec connection (algorithms, protocols, modes, keys). The OAKLEY protocol is the one that carries out the negotiation process.
You can think of ISAKMP as providing the playing field (the infrastructure) and OAKLEY as the guy running up and down the playing field (carrying out the steps of the negotiation).
IPSec is very complex with all of its components and possible configurations. This complexity is what provides for a great degree of flexibility, because a company has many different configuration choices to achieve just the right level of protection. If this is all new to you and still confusing, please review one or more of the following references to help fill in the gray areas.
The following answers are incorrect:
The other options are distractors.
The following reference(s) were/was used to create this question:
Shon Harris, CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide- fiveth edition, page 759
and
https://neodean.wordpress.com/tag/security-protocol/

The order of implementation is: initiation, development, implementation, operation/maintenance, and disposal.

Section: Network and Telecommunications
Explanation/Reference:
Secure shell (SSH) was designed as an alternative to some of the insecure protocols and allows users to securely access resources on remote computers over an encrypted tunnel. The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network. The SSH authentication protocol runs on top of the SSH transport layer protocol and provides a single authenticated tunnel for the SSH connection protocol.
SSH's services include remote log-on, file transfer, and command execution. It also supports port forwarding, which redirects other protocols through an encrypted SSH tunnel. Many users protect less secure traffic of protocols, such as X Windows and VNC (virtual network computing), by forwarding them through a SSH tunnel.
The SSH tunnel protects the integrity of communication, preventing session hijacking and other man-in-the- middle attacks. Another advantage of SSH over its predecessors is that it supports strong authentication.
There are several alternatives for SSH clients to authenticate to a SSH server, including passwords and digital certificates.
Keep in mind that authenticating with a password is still a significant improvement over the other protocols because the password is transmitted encrypted.
There are two incompatible versions of the protocol, SSH-1 and SSH-2, though many servers support both.
SSH-2 has improved integrity checks (SSH-1 is vulnerable to an insertion attack due to weak CRC-32 integrity checking) and supports local extensions and additional types of digital certificates such as Open PGP. SSH was originally designed for UNIX, but there are now implementations for other operating systems, including Windows, Macintosh, and OpenVMS.
Is SSH 3.0 the same as SSH3?
The short answer is: NO SSH 3.0 refers to version 3 of SSH Communications SSH2 protocol implementation and it could also refer to OpenSSH Version 3.0 of its SSH2 software. The "3" refers to the software release version not the protocol version. As of this writing (July 2013), there is no SSH3 protocol.
"Server authentication" is incorrect. Though many SSH clients allow pre-caching of server/host keys, this is a minimal form of server/host authentication.
"Host authentication" is incorrect. Though many SSH clients allow pre-caching of server/host keys, this is a minimal form of server/host authentication.
"Guest authentication" is incorrect. The general idea of "guest" is that it is unauthenticated access.
Reference(s) used for this question:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4252.txt
Hernandez CISSP, Steven (2012-12-21). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Third Edition ((ISC)2 Press) (Kindle Locations 7080-7088). Auerbach Publications. Kindle Edition.

Section: Network and Telecommunications
Explanation/Reference:
Port 119 is normally used for the Network News Transfer Protocol. It is thus not need for a mail server, which would normally listen to ports 25 (SMTP), 110 (POP3) and 143 (IMAP).
Source: STREBE, Matthew and PERKINS, Charles, Firewalls 24seven, Sybex 2000, Chapter 1: Understanding Firewalls.