Domain-based split tunneling behaves fundamentally differently from traditional access-route-based split tunneling: where access-route tunneling operates purely through entries in the local operating system routing table, domain-based split tunneling is implemented through a filter driver on Windows and a network extension on macOS that intercepts and redirects connections dynamically as domains are resolved and matched, rather than by inserting static host routes the administrator or user can simply read from a routing table. Because the enforcement mechanism itself lives inside this filter driver/extension rather than in visible routing entries, the documented, reliable way to confirm the configuration has actually been pushed correctly and is being applied as expected is to collect detailed, dump-level GlobalProtect application logs, which expose the filter driver ' s internal decision-making for the specified domain - this is precisely option B, and it matches Palo Alto Networks ' own published troubleshooting guidance for this feature. Checking the routing table (option A) is the correct verification method for route-based (access-route) split tunneling, but it is explicitly documented as not reflective of domain-based split tunnel behavior, since no corresponding static route is guaranteed to appear there. Verifying DNS resolution alone (option C) confirms name resolution occurred, but not that the filter driver actually applied the correct include/exclude action to the resulting session. Pinging the domain (option D) is unreliable because split-tunneling rules apply to TCP/UDP traffic and explicitly do not govern ICMP, so a ping result does not validate split-tunnel enforcement at all.
Reference:GlobalProtect - Troubleshoot Split Tunnel Domain and Application Configuration.

GlobalProtect is the correct mobile-user connection method here because the requirement explicitly calls for remote site connectivity from mobile users to the branch locations, in addition to internet filtering and data center access - a full-tunnel capability that Explicit Proxy, which is scoped to web/proxy-aware traffic only, cannot provide. Remote Networks is the purpose-built onboarding method for the branch locations, tunneling their traffic into Prisma Access over IPSec for consistent internet filtering and, through the shared backbone, reachability to data center resources. Service connections are the piece that stitches both populations to the data center: they terminate at the customer ' s HQ/data center and, once established, become reachable from both the GlobalProtect mobile user pool and the Remote Networks locations across the Prisma Access backbone, satisfying the data center connectivity requirement for both user types without requiring a dedicated tunnel per site. Option B and D are eliminated because Explicit Proxy cannot deliver full network- layer access to internal branch or data center resources; it is designed for outbound web traffic redirection via PAC file or forwarding profile, not IPSec-based site-to-site or full-tunnel remote access. Option C omits Remote Networks entirely, which would leave the branch offices unconnected. GlobalProtect plus Remote Networks plus service connections is the standard, minimal-footprint design pattern for this exact hybrid mobile-user/branch/data-center topology.
Reference:Prisma Access Mobile Users (GlobalProtect) and Prisma Access Remote Networks - Deployment Fundamentals.

Forcing all application access through PAB for unmanaged or non-compliant devices requires addressing two distinct application authentication patterns separately, since a single enforcement mechanism cannot cover both. For applications that are integrated with the organization ' s identity provider and support SSO, the Enforce SSO setting ensures that any attempt to authenticate to that application is redirected specifically through the PAB-brokered session rather than allowing a direct, out-of-band login that would bypass PAB ' s controls entirely - this closes the most common bypass path for SSO-capable SaaS and web applications.
For applications that are not SSO-enabled and therefore cannot be gated the same way, Account Protection provides the complementary enforcement mechanism, restricting direct credential-based access to those applications outside of the PAB session so that even non-SSO applications cannot be reached through an unmanaged, unenforced path. Together, these two settings comprehensively cover both application authentication models, which is why options A and B form the correct pair. The PAB Extension (option C) is a deployment and traffic-redirection mechanism, but on its own it does not enforce that access only happens through PAB - a user could still, without SSO enforcement or Account Protection in place, log in to an application directly outside the extension ' s redirected session. Device Posture (option D) is used to assess and act on a device ' s compliance state to allow or block traffic generally; it is a conditional access input, not the specific enforcement mechanism that closes the SSO and non-SSO application bypass paths described in the question.
Reference:Prisma Access Browser - Enforce SSO and Account Protection for Application Access Control.

In a Prisma Access mobile user deployment using SAML through the Cloud Identity Engine, the Cloud Identity Engine - not Strata Cloud Manager directly - is the SAML service provider entity that actually exchanges metadata and assertions with the customer ' s IdP; Strata Cloud Manager ' s role is to reference the authentication profile the Cloud Identity Engine has already established, not to independently hold the SAML relationship with the IdP. The error message explicitly names " CIE-SAML " as the point of failure, which is a strong, direct indicator that the misconfiguration lives in the metadata exchange between the Cloud Identity Engine and the IdP specifically, rather than anywhere downstream in Strata Cloud Manager itself. A 400 Bad Request returned to the portal after IdP authentication typically points to a malformed or mismatched SAML assertion, entity ID, or ACS URL between these two specific parties, making a targeted review of CIE-to-IdP metadata (option C) the correct, root-cause-focused action, since the question also states that " URLs and certificates are correctly configured " from the general check already performed in option A ' s framing - pointing the investigation toward CIE specifically. Reviewing Security policy rules (option B) addresses network-layer reachability, not SAML protocol-level metadata errors, and would not explain a 400 Bad Request occurring after successful IdP login. Reviewing Authentication logs (option D) is a reasonable general diagnostic step but does not, by itself, identify the root cause the way directly verifying the CIE-to- IdP metadata configuration does.
Reference:Cloud Identity Engine - SAML Authentication Troubleshooting for Prisma Access Mobile Users.

The PAB Extension ' s core architectural advantage is that it enforces web access and data control policy at the browser layer itself, rather than depending on a full-tunnel VPN connection to redirect traffic through Prisma Access; this means policy enforcement continues to apply to a managed device ' s browser-based access to sanctioned web applications even when that device is not currently connected to VPN, which is exactly the gap the question describes and the capability option A correctly identifies. Because the enforcement point is the browser session rather than the network path, security and data controls (such as access restrictions, DLP, watermarking, and clipboard controls) remain consistently applied for supported browsers regardless of whether the underlying device happens to be VPN-connected at that moment - extending policy reach beyond what a purely network-based tunnel approach could achieve. Option B is incorrect because the Extension specifically operates at the browser level and does not tunnel all endpoint traffic; that full-device tunneling behavior describes a VPN client model, which is the opposite of what makes the Extension valuable for this exact scenario. Option C describes remote browser isolation, which is a separate, more resource-intensive capability generally reserved for isolating risky or unmanaged browsing sessions, not the defining mechanism of the lightweight browser Extension for managed devices. Option D mischaracterizes the Extension ' s purpose as network performance optimization, when its actual function is policy enforcement and data protection, not throughput or latency improvement.
Reference:Prisma Access Browser - PAB Extension for Managed Devices Without Active VPN.