The correct answer is B, "Repeated observations of staff will be required in order to demonstrate that the program has been effective," as this statement is true regarding the assessment of the effectiveness of the education program. According to the Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) guidelines, evaluating the impact of an education program on hand-hygiene compliance in a long-term care facility requires ongoing monitoring to assess sustained behavior change. Repeated observations provide direct evidence of staff adherence to hand-hygiene protocols over time, allowing the infection preventionist (IP) to measure the program's effectiveness beyond initial training (CBIC Practice Analysis, 2022, Domain IV: Education and Research, Competency 4.2 - Evaluate the effectiveness of educational programs). This method aligns with the World Health Organization (WHO) and CDC recommendations for hand-hygiene improvement, which emphasize continuous auditing to ensure lasting improvements in compliance rates.
Option A (a summative evaluation will accurately reflect the extent to which participants will change their hand-hygiene practices) is incorrect because a summative evaluation, typically conducted at the end of a program, assesses overall outcomes but does not predict future behavior changes or account for long-term compliance, which is critical in this context. Option C (a change between pre- and post-test scores correlates well with the expected change in hand-hygiene compliance) is misleading; while pre- and post-tests can measure knowledge gain, they do not reliably correlate with actual practice changes, as knowledge does not always translate to behavior without observation. Option D (an evaluation of the program is not required if the program is mandatory) is false, as mandatory programs still require evaluation to verify effectiveness, especially when addressing low compliance, per CBIC and quality improvement standards.
The focus on repeated observations aligns with CBIC's emphasis on data-driven assessment to improve infection prevention practices, ensuring that the education program leads to sustained hand-hygiene improvements and reduces healthcare-associated infections (CBIC Practice Analysis, 2022, Domain II:
Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation, Competency 2.4 - Evaluate the effectiveness of infection prevention and control interventions).
References: CBIC Practice Analysis, 2022, Domain II: Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation, Competency 2.4 - Evaluate the effectiveness of infection prevention and control interventions; Domain IV:
Education and Research, Competency 4.2 - Evaluate the effectiveness of educational programs. WHO Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Health Care, 2009. CDC Hand Hygiene in Healthcare Settings, 2019.

Before initiating airborne precautions, the infection preventionist must first confirm the clinical suspicion of active TB.
Step-by-Step Justification:
* Confirming Active TB:
* A positive tuberculin skin test (TST) alone does not indicate active disease.
* A review of chest X-ray, symptoms, and risk factors is needed.
* Medical Record Review:
* Past TB history, imaging, and sputum testing are key to diagnosis.
* Not all TST-positive patients require isolation.
Why Other Options Are Incorrect:
* A. Contact the roommate's physician to initiate TST: Premature, as no confirmation of active TB exists yet.
* C. Report findings to Employee Health for staff follow-up: Should occur only after TB confirmation.
* D. Transfer to airborne isolation immediately: Airborne isolation is necessary only if active TB is suspected based on clinical findings.
CBIC Infection Control References:

The infectiousness of tuberculosis (TB) is directly related to the number of Mycobacterium tuberculosis organisms expelled into the air by an infected patient.
Step-by-Step Justification:
* TB Transmission Mechanism:
* TB spreads through airborne droplet nuclei, which remain suspended for long periods.
* Factors Affecting Infectiousness:
* High bacterial load in sputum: Smear-positive patients are much more infectious.
* Coughing and sneezing frequency: More expelled droplets increase exposure risk.
* Environmental factors: Poor ventilation increases transmission.
Why Other Options Are Incorrect:
* A. Hand hygiene habits: TB is airborne, not transmitted via hands.
* B. Presence of acid-fast bacilli (AFB) in blood: TB is not typically hematogenous, and blood AFB does not correlate with infectiousness.
* C. Tuberculin skin test (TST) >20 mm: TST indicates prior exposure, not infectiousness.
CBIC Infection Control References:
* APIC Text, "Tuberculosis Transmission and Control Measures".

The scenario involves a febrile neonate in an intensive care unit (ICU) with three out of four blood cultures growing coagulase-negative staphylococci (CoNS) over the past week. The Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) emphasizes accurate interpretation of microbiological data in the
"Identification of Infectious Disease Processes" domain, aligning with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for healthcare-associated infections. Determining whether this represents a true infection, contamination, colonization, or laboratory error requires evaluating the clinical and microbiological context.
Option B, "Contamination," is the most likely indication. Coagulase-negative staphylococci, such as Staphylococcus epidermidis, are common skin flora and frequent contaminants in blood cultures, especially in neonates where skin preparation or sampling technique may be challenging. The CDC's "Guidelines for the Prevention of Intravascular Catheter-Related Infections" (2017) and the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) note that multiple positive cultures (e.g., two or more) are typically required to confirm true bacteremia, particularly with CoNS, unless accompanied by clear clinical signs of infection (e.g., worsening fever, hemodynamic instability) and no other explanation. The inconsistency (three out of four cultures) and the neonate's ICU setting-where contamination from skin or catheter hubs is common-suggest that the positive cultures likely result from contamination during blood draw rather than true infection. Studies, such as those in the Journal of Clinical Microbiology (e.g., Beekmann et al., 2005), indicate that CoNS in blood cultures is contaminated in 70-80% of cases when not supported by robust clinical correlation.
Option A, "Laboratory error," is possible but less likely as the primary explanation. Laboratory errors (e.g., mislabeling or processing mistakes) could occur, but the repeated growth in three of four cultures suggests a consistent finding rather than a random error, making contamination a more plausible cause. Option C,
"Colonization," refers to the presence of microorganisms on or in the body without invasion or immune response. While CoNS can colonize the skin or catheter sites, colonization does not typically result in positive blood cultures unless there is an invasive process, which is not supported by the data here. Option D,
"Infection," is the least likely without additional evidence. True CoNS bloodstream infections (e.g., catheter- related) in neonates are serious but require consistent positive cultures, clinical deterioration (e.g., persistent fever, leukocytosis), and often imaging or catheter removal confirmation. The febrile state alone, with inconsistent culture results, does not meet the CDC's criteria for diagnosing infection (e.g., at least two positive cultures from separate draws).
The CBIC Practice Analysis (2022) and CDC guidelines stress differentiating contamination from infection to avoid unnecessary treatment, which can drive antibiotic resistance. Given the high likelihood of contamination with CoNS in this context, Option B is the most accurate answer.
References:
* CBIC Practice Analysis, 2022.
* CDC Guidelines for the Prevention of Intravascular Catheter-Related Infections, 2017.
* Beekmann, S. E., et al. (2005). Coagulase-Negative Staphylococci in Blood Cultures. Journal of Clinical Microbiology.
* CLSI Guidelines on Blood Culture Interpretation, 2018.

The scenario describes a potential outbreak of multidrug-resistant Enterococcus faecium in an extended-care facility (ECF) wing, indicated by four positive cultures (including the current case and three prior cases from urine and a draining wound) within a month. The organism exhibits resistance to ampicillin, vancomycin, and penicillin, but sensitivity to linezolid, suggesting a possible vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) strain, which is a significant concern in healthcare settings. The Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) emphasizes the importance of rapid outbreak detection and response in the
"Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation" domain, aligning with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for managing multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs).
Option A, "Notify the medical director of the outbreak," is the most immediate and critical action. Identifying an outbreak-defined by the CDC as two or more cases of a similar illness linked by time and place-requires prompt notification to the facility's leadership (e.g., medical director) to initiate a coordinated response. The presence of four Enterococcus cases, including a multidrug-resistant strain, within a single ECF wing over a month suggests a potential cluster, necessitating urgent action to assess the scope, implement control measures, and allocate resources. The CDC's "Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings" (2006) recommends immediate reporting to facility leadership as the first step to activate an outbreak investigation team, making this the priority.
Option B, "Compare the four culture reports and sensitivity patterns," is an important subsequent step in outbreak investigation. Analyzing the antibiotic susceptibility profiles and culture sources can confirm whether the cases are epidemiologically linked (e.g., clonal spread of VRE) and guide treatment and control strategies. However, this is a detailed analysis that follows initial notification and should not delay alerting the medical director. Option C, "Conduct surveillance cultures for this organism in all residents," is a proactive measure to determine the prevalence of Enterococcus faecium, especially VRE, within the wing. The CDC recommends targeted surveillance during outbreaks, but this requires prior authorization and planning by the outbreak team, making it a secondary action after notification. Option D, "Notify the nursing administrator to close the wing to new admissions," may be a control measure to prevent further spread, as suggested by the CDC for MDRO outbreaks. However, closing a unit is a significant decision that should be guided by the medical director and infection control team after assessing the situation, not an immediate independent action by the IP.
The CBIC Practice Analysis (2022) and CDC guidelines prioritize rapid communication with leadership to initiate a structured outbreak response, including resource allocation and policy adjustments. Given the multidrug-resistant nature and cluster pattern, notifying the medical director (Option A) is the most immediate and appropriate action to ensure a comprehensive response.
References:
* CBIC Practice Analysis, 2022.
* CDC Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings, 2006.