+------+-----+--------------------------------------+
| load | reg | address |
+ ------+-----+--------------------------------------+
(Effective address = address as given in instruction)
This requires space in an instruction for quite a large address. It is often available on CISC machines which have variable-length instructions, such as x86.
Some RISC machines have a special Load Upper Literal instruction which places a 16-bit constant in the top half of a register. An OR literal instruction can be used to insert a 16-bit constant in the lower half of that register, so that a full 32-bit address can then be used via the register-indirect addressing mode, which itself is provided as "base-plus-offset" with an offset of 0.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Addressing_mode (Very good coverage of the subject) also see:
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the
Ten Domains of Computer Security, page 186.
also see:
http://www.comsci.us/ic/notes/am.html

PERMANENTLY is the keyword used in the question. You need to find out data removal method which remove data permanently from magnetic media.
Degaussing is the most effective method out of all provided choices to erase sensitive data on magnetic media provided magnetic media is not require to be reuse. Some degaussers can destroy drives. The security professional should exercise caution when recommending or using degaussers on media for reuse.
A device that performs degaussing generates a coercive magnetic force that reduces the magnetic flux density of the storage media to zero. This magnetic force is what properly erases data from media. Data are stored on magnetic media by the representation of the polarization of the atoms. Degaussing changes this polarization (magnetic alignment) by using a type of large magnet to bring it back to its original flux (magnetic alignment).
For your exam you should know the information below:
When media is to be reassigned (a form of object reuse), it is important that all residual data is carefully removed.
Simply deleting files or formatting the media does not actually remove the information. File deletion and media formatting often simply remove the pointers to the information.
Providing assurance for object reuse requires specialized tools and techniques according to the type of media on which the data resides.
Specialized hardware devices known as degaussers can be used to erase data saved to magnetic media. The measure of the amount of energy needed to reduce the magnetic field on the media to zero is known as coercivity. It is important to make sure that the coercivity of the degausser is of sufficient strength to meet object reuse requirements when erasing data. If a degausser is used with insufficient coercivity, then a remanence of the data will exist.
Remanence is the measure of the existing magnetic field on the media; it is the residue that remains after an object is degaussed or written over. Data is still recoverable even when the remanence is small. While data remanence exists, there is no assurance of safe object reuse. Some degaussers can destroy drives. The security professional should exercise caution when recommending or using degaussers on media for reuse.
Software tools also exist that can provide object reuse assurance. These tools overwrite every sector of magnetic media with a random or predetermined bit pattern. Overwrite methods are effective for all forms of electronic media with the exception of read-only optical media. There is a drawback to using overwrite software. During normal write operations with magnetic media, the head of the drive moves back-and-forth across the media as data is written. The track of the head does not usually follow the exact path each time. The result is a miniscule amount of data remanence with each pass. With specialized equipment, it is possible to read data that has been overwritten.
To provide higher assurance in this case, it is necessary to overwrite each sector multiple times. Security practitioners should keep in mind that a one-time pass may be acceptable for noncritical information, but sensitive data should be overwritten with multiple passes.
Overwrite software can also be used to clear the sectors within solid-state media such as
USB thumb drives. It is suggested that physical destruction methods such as incineration or secure recycling should be considered for solid-state media that is no longer used.
The last form of preventing unauthorized access to sensitive data is media destruction.
Shredding, burning, grinding, and pulverizing are common methods of physically destroying media. Degaussing can also be a form of media destruction. High-power degaussers are so strong in some cases that they can literally bend and warp the platters in a hard drive.
Shredding and burning are effective destruction methods for non-rigid magnetic media.
Indeed, some shredders are capable of shredding some rigid media such as an optical disk. This may be an effective alternative for any optical media containing nonsensitive information due to the residue size remaining after feeding the disk into the machine.
However, the residue size might be too large for media containing sensitive information.
Alternatively, grinding and pulverizing are acceptable choices for rigid and solid-state media. Specialized devices are available for grinding the face of optical media that either sufficiently scratches the surface to render the media unreadable or actually grinds off the data layer of the disk. Several services also exist which will collect drives, destroy them on site if requested and provide certification of completion. It will be the responsibility of the security professional to help, select, and maintain the most appropriate solutions for media cleansing and disposal.
The following answers are incorrect:
Overwrite every sector of magnetic media with pattern of 1's and 0's- Less effective than degaussing provided magnetic media is not require to be reuse.
Format magnetic media - Formatting magnetic media does not erase all data. Data can be recoverable after formatting using software tools.
Delete File allocation table - It will not erase all data. Data can be recoverable using software tools.
The following reference(s) were/was used to create this question:
CISA review manual 2014 Page number 338
Official ISC2 guide to CISSP CBK 3rd Edition Page number 720

SAML is an XML-based standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between different parties, such as a service provider and an identity provider. SAML enables single sign-on (SSO) for web applications, which means that users can access multiple services with one set of credentials. SAML also improves security by not passing the users' password during authentication, but instead using assertions that contain information about the user's identity and attributes. SAML assertions are digitally signed and encrypted to ensure their integrity and confidentiality. SAML does not use TLS to address confidentiality, although it can be used as an additional layer of protection. SAML does not limit unnecessary data entry on web forms, although it can reduce the need for users to enter their credentials repeatedly. References: CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, Eighth Edition, Chapter 5: Identity and Access Management, page 291. Official (ISC)2 CISSP CBK Reference, Fifth Edition, Domain 5: Identity and Access Management (IAM), page 609.