IIS stores website access logs by default under %SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs\LogFiles, so copying those files preserves requests, client addresses, status codes, and timestamps relevant to the web-server compromise.
Windows service start, stop, failure, and configuration events are written by the Service Control Manager to the System log; exporting those filtered events from the affected Windows server directly addresses the attacker's shutdown of critical services. The Security log may contain authentication or object-access evidence, but it is not the specified source for Service Control Manager events. C:\Windows\Temp\Logs is not the standard IIS logging directory, and the service evidence belongs to the affected Windows server, not the IIS server's Security log. This maps to CBRFIR Forensics Techniques objective 2.2: identify required forensic files and their host locations. Microsoft IIS logging Microsoft Event Viewer overview

The Wireshark output shows SMB protocol transactions, including NT Create AndX Response and Write AndX Response, indicating the transfer of files or objects. SMB (Server Message Block) is a protocol used for file sharing and printer access in Windows networks. The log does not indicate phishing or redirection behavior but rather normal SMB communication such as accessing files or shared resources.
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The relationship graph links a suspicious file hash to email targets, email subjects or attachments, sender and recipient artifacts, and related infrastructure. That evidence pattern represents an email-delivered phishing campaign. ARP spoofing would require local-network evidence such as conflicting IP-to-MAC mappings or unsolicited ARP replies; none appears here. A distributed denial-of-service attack would show high-volume traffic or numerous sources overwhelming a service, not relationships between a file and email observables. A man-in-the-middle attack would require evidence of intercepted or altered communications. The graph is therefore most consistent with phishing, where a malicious attachment or link is distributed to selected recipients. This analysis fits CBRFIR Incident Response Techniques objectives 3.9 and 3.10, which require analysts to interpret threat-intelligence artifacts, identify IOCs or IOAs, and determine the associated threat profile rather than judging an artifact in isolation. Cisco CBRFIR v1.2 exam topics

The safest and most effective approach is to isolate the files and subject them to heuristic and behavioral analysis. This can reveal obfuscated malware or unauthorized data storage techniques, even if signature-based antivirus fails to flag them.